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Knowledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism
D.

(A

J.

Furley

revised version of a paper read at the
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
at Boston in December

1967.)

There is an obvious paradox in the theories of the Atomists.
that nothing exists but atoms and void,
small,

and invariant in quality.

these materials and no others;
motions of invariant atoms.

and that the atoms are imperceptibly

The thinking part of a man is composed of

his thinking can only be a function of the

Knowledge of the external world must be some kind

of reaction between the atoms of the external world and
man;

and

They held

the atoms of the thinking

the only reaction in the atomist's theory is simply collision.

is to say,

That

the connexion between the thinking subject and the external world is

nothing but touch:

utactus enim,

strenuously insists

(2. 434).

tactus,

pro divum numina sancta"

as Lucretius

The Atomists are then ready to show how all our

senses are really varieties of the sense of touch;

each faculty of sense is

stimulated by actual contact with suitable formations of atoms proceeding from
the external world.
It is a picture which h as a certain plausibility as a theory of sensation.
And the atomists liked to say that sensation is indeed the basis for all our
contact with the external world.

The paradox of course is this:

if knowledge

comes to us by means of sensation, how are we to explain the atomist1s knowledge
of the bas � c propositions of his special theory:
void,

which is called "the intangible",

imperceptibly small?

and atoms,

that the world consists of
which are said to be

It is a question which arises with regard to the earlier

Atomists and t he Postaristotelians;

but this paper deals only with the

latter.

-2-

One answer to the question has acquired authority during the last few

decades of classical scholarship, and

I want first to examine it.

known statement is in the work on Epicurus by Cyril Bailey.1
Bailey,

Its best

According to

the Epicureans believed in a form of direct Jmowledge of the external

world which by-passed sense perception.
mind analogous to focussing the eyes,

It was

a

sort of focussing of the

straining the ears, dilating the nostrils

(and presumably doing whatever one does do to the tongue and the skin for the
other two senses).
Bailey correctly drew attention2 to a striking difference in what Epicurus
said about the two classes of subjects which he grouped together under the
heading adela

(non-evident).

Meteorology and the stars were one such class;

Epicurus asserted that since we cannot get the close view and since many
explanations of the same phenomenon are often equally in conformity with our
observations,
true.

the philosopher must hold all these explanations to be equally

To prefer one to the others,

he said,

would be to plunge into mythology.3

And everybody knows that the Epicureans exhibited something like relish in
offering multiple explanations for these things.4
However,

the fundamental principles of the atomic theory, such as the

statement that there exist atoms,
sort of being,

and so on -

-

these are also

to direct sense-perception.
multiple explanations:

that there is void,

��'

But in this case,

that there is no third

in that they are not accessible

the Epicureans accepted no

just one theory was right,

and one could accept it

confidently.
What was the Epicureans'

justification for this certainty?

Bailey thought

he had found the answer in the expression used by Epicurus with some frequency
but without definition:

"epibole te!s dianoias".

I quote from Bailey:5

-3-

11Thought -- or reasoning

about the ultimate realities of the world is

conducted by the comparison and combination of "clear"

concepts,

each s tage

in the process being a new concept recognized as self-evident.

T hes e concepts

are grasped by 'an ac t of ap pre hension on the part�of the mind'

(epibole tes

dianoias)
vision'

exactly similar to that by which the senses apprehend the 'clear

of the near object,

or the mind the subtle images which penetrate to

it."
This assertion was defended

in a long appendix on epibole tes dianoias

which Bailey put at the end of both of his books on Epicurus.

Striking use of Bailey's explanation was made by Cornford,
chapter of his Pr in cipi u m S a pie ntiae ,

where he attacks the verdict of some

�riters that Epicureanism was one of the most "scientific11
sophical systems.

Cornford says:

6

in the second

of ancient

philo-

"A system which professes to rest on the

testimony of the infallible senses might be expected to put forward only a
tentative hypothesis about the w holly imperceptible,
of

j udgmen t

caution:

•

•

•

Bu t Epicurus'

and to recommend suspension

at titu de is exactly the reverse of this sceptical

he is more dogmatic in this field than in either of the other two

'Atomism is not one among several possible theories of the universe,

•

nor with

regard to any of its details is there a hint that any other view than that
expounded by E picuru s himself /could be true,'

(Bailey �

265).

Epicurus is

\

content to assert roundly that his atomism is the only theory consistent with
phenomena.11
A cur ious feature of this appreciation of Epicurus is the way in which it
ignores some of the evidenc e,

and distorts the reste

we come by our knowledge of atoms and the void?"
look for the answer in the obvious place:

namely,

"How did Epicurus suppose

Bailey asks.

But he does not

in the text in w h i c h Epicurus

-4-

defends his basic propositions.

Instead he seizes upon the obscure phrase

epibole tes dianoias and manipulates the contexts

7

in which it appears until

they seem to justify his theory of direct mental apprehension.
It must be conceded first that the notion of direct mental apprehension

�

play a part in Epicureanism.

What I want to deny is only that it plays

the supremely important part in the foundations of the atomic theory that Bailey
has given to it.
There is enough textual evidence in Epicurus himself and Lucretius to show
that the Epicureans held that certain eidola,
which cause sense-perception,
fine

(leptos),

of the same kind as the eidola

do not stimulate the senses,

because they are too

but rather penetrate directly to the soul-atoms of the mind.

There they may produce a phantasia or image,
produced by sensation.

8

which is similar to the images

The experiences which the Epicureans hoped to explain

by this thesis were dream-visions,

certain types of imagination

(in the modern

sense), and especially ideas about the gods.
The texts which serve as our evidence for this theory do not speak of the
fundamental propositions about atoms and the void.

It is my belief that this

theory was strictly limited to the explanation of those experiences with which
it is associated in the surviving texts.
The inflation of epibole tes dianoias into a kind of intuitive knowledge
which includes knowledge of the fundamental propositions of atomism can be
This text is in the right

punctured by the study of one text in particular.
place:

that is, it is no obiter dictum,

Herodotus,
world.

§

50-51,

but centrally placed in t he Letter to

in the passage that deals with our knowledge of the external
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the error would

second •;1oti_on,

hension of

t�e

motion,

there

if

error arises,
ation,

in

not

ourselves,

i��?e,

and

truth.13

is
if

have h::i ppened

but

different

is

did

we

not heve

connected with the

no confirmation,
there

if

from

it;

Pppre-

in this

or refutation,

conf irmP t ton

or

no

refut

-1-

Sentence A of this text is about reliable perception and mental apprehension.

It might perhaps be thought that the word epibletikos mentions the necessary and
sufficient condition for reliable perception; but this need not be so.

The

conditions for reliable perception are mentioned in·the clause beginning
Mental images (phantasiai) are reliable when they are produced by

ginomene.

the successive repetition of the eidolon

(that is, when a constant stream of

eidola comes from the external object to the perceiver,
looking at the object),
the eidolon

(that is,

experience) .14
process",

as when one is directly

or when they come about through what is left behind by

the pattern left behind as a memory by previous sense

The word epibletikos means no more than "by the apprehensive

the process by which the mind or the senses "get hold of" something.

This is confirmed by a fragment of the lost work of Epicurus On Nature,
the epibletikos tropos is contrasted with "proceeding from

where

oneself alone"

(29.15.8).
Sentences B,

c, and D are all about illusion.

This is the point missed by

the editors, who believe that C is about reliable perception.
whole is telling us something essentially simple,

The passage as a

and it runs like this:

Sentence A (following a description of the eidola and their reception by
the perceiver):

The image that results from the apprehension of eidola, when

it comes from a succession of eidola, not just a random one,
corresponds to a memory image,

or when it

reproduces the shape of the external object

which produced the eidola.
Sentence B.

Error is not in the act of apprehension,

movement of the soul,
Sentence C.

called

but in a subsequent

�.

The
misleading resemb lance between dream-images and other
.
V'

illusory appearances15 on the one hand and what is true and real on the other

•

-

8

-

the resemblance which leads into the error of supposing that the illusion is
the truth -- exists because illusory images,

as well as reliable images,

produced by the apprehension of real eidola (real eidola,

are

we have to understand,

but not in a steady succession).16
Sentence D.

Error occurs when such an image is wrongly assessed by

the "second rr.otion"
clear image,

(.!?.£.

of soul atoms) "in ourselves":

resulting fr01n a steady stream of eidola,

Here, then,
of many kinds.

when it is not.

This surely should have been enough to give Bailey pause.

�

What

the explanation of illusory dreams an d

the guarantee of scientific truth?

�

it is treated as a

epibole tes dianoias occurs in the explanation of illusions

kind of a concept is it that is
visions,

�

If this phrase is to mean "an

act of deliberate attention" is it not disconcerting to find it in an account
of dreams?
At this point we can turn to the other approach to Epicurus'
knowledge of the atomi c theory:
it.

First,

that is,

idea of his

the method of argument used to defend

it may be worth saying that Bailey and Cornford were probably

distracted from this approach by the notion, which seems to me mistaken,

that

we must look for the distinguishing characteristics of an empirical theory in
the manner in which the theory is first reached, rather than the manner in which
it is defended.

As against this,

I agree with Popper, who wrote at the begin•

ning of his Logic of Scientific Discovery, "The question of how
occurs to a man

•

•

•

a

new idea

ma y be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it

is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.

1117

The relevant section of the Letter to Herodotus is preceded by a methodo
logical not:e:

"We mus.t contro! all our investigation by the sensations and by

the immediate apprehensions
criteria,

(epibolai) either of the mind ,or the various other

likewise by the immediate feelings, so that we can make inferences

about that which is in suspense and about things which are unclear."18

•

-9He continues at once:

HAbout thin gs that are unclear,

following points made and keep them in mind.

we must get the

First that nothing comes to be

out of that which does not exist; for everything would in that case be coming
into being with no need of seeds."
Notice the very simple method:

he asserts his thesis,

contradictory the protasis of a conditional statement,
a proposition falsified by sense-perception.

"P.

then makes its

of which the apodosis

For,

if not-P,

then

Q,

is

which

ris observed to be f alse".
We have very nearly the same pattern repeated frequently,

and especially

in the argument for the existence of void, which became famous and much talked
about in antiquity -- indeed it was famous before Epicurus used it at all,

for

it was used in the reverse direction by the Eleatics, 19 and was almost certainly
borrowed from them by Leucippus and Democritus.20
First Epicurus notes that the existence of somata is confirmed by the
direct evidence of the senses,
what is unclear by reasoning

"which we must use for making inferences about

{logismos)".

He goes on,

11

If there did not exist

that which we call void and space and untouchable nature,
nowhere to be or to move,
The schema is this:
be no motion,

bodies would have

as they are observed to move.11
"Void exists:

for if void did not exist,

there would

which we observe to be false.iv

A century or more after Epicurus, when Stoic logic was developed into a
systematic study,

this pattern of inference was formalized and grouped with

other similar patterns.

It is in fact the second of the undemonstrated

arguments collected by Benson Mates
the second

Not the second;

(Stoic Logic,

p.

71):

"If the first, then

therefore not the first,n with negative propo

sitions substituted for the propositional variables.

•

-10-

The Stoics, with their new interest in logic and epistemology,
Epicureans.

Although the Epicureans were probably never much interested in

logic as such,
criticism.

attacked the

they evidently felt impelled to offer some sort of reply to Stoic

We have evidence of their replies in the Epicurean work by Philodemus ,

called On Signs,

which partly survi ves in the form of badly mutilated papyrus

It was published by Gomperz in the 1860s,

fragments.

study of it by Philippson in 1909 and 1910,

and there was a further

so there was no excuse for Bailey's

total neglect of it in his books on Epicureanism;

though of course he did not

have the advantage of Professor DeLacy's edition of it.

This book should at

least be scrutinised for any evidence it may provide on the way the Epicureans
thought about the epistemological basis of their theory.
Herculaneum papyri which contain Epicurean material
unrolled and read),

Philodemus'

Like all the

(a t least, those so far

On Signs has very limited value.

What it does

show is that a debate went on about the validity of inductive inference.
Stoics,

The

it appears, wanted a logic of science based on the model of Aristotelian
in which only necessary truths would be admitted.

apodeixis,

Hence they claimed

that the implica t ion "If there is motion, then there is void" was valid,
if it was contradictory to deny the second a nd assert the first; i.e.
void were somehow involved in the definition of motion.
with an insistence that the in � erence is empirical,

only

only if

The Epicureans replied

not analytic.

"We study

all the things that move in our experience and we reckon up th e accompanying
conditions,

without which we see nothing move;

and we claim that everything

that moves,

moves like these things, and so infer that there cannot be motion

1
without void .112
Now,
precision.

these Epicurean arguments are no doubt naive and lacking in scientific
But they do not, so far as I can see,

proposition "there is void",

suggest that knowledge of the

and of the other basic proposition of the atomic

•

-11-

theory,

was thought to depend upon some kind of direct mental perception called

epibole tes dianoias.

Of course,

the Stoics had a point when they said that the

arguments which moved from instances in our experience to instances outside our
But

experience depend on the assumption that there are uniformities in nature.
this is clearly only a weakness if you demand analytic truth in the realm of
empirical knowledge.

where

However let us look at some Epicurean arguments of a different type,
the appeal to sense-perception is less obvious.

One example is the argument with which Epicurus supports his theory of
to en te atomo elachiston,

or minimae partes,

as Lucretius calls them.

are other ways of reading this argument, but if I am right about it,
the following:

it is impossible,

in that case,

There

it includes

Suppose that an atom contains infinitely numerous parts,

of them having size:
finite in size,

22

each

to see how it can still be

since the parts must all be of some size, and if they are

infinitely numerous,

the total must be infinitely large.

Hence we must not

suppose that the atom is infinitely divisible.
This argument contains the expression ouk esti noesai, "it cannot be
thought11,

"it is impossible to see".

of direct intuition?
dianoias,

Does this indicate some appeal to a kind

Are we perhaps supposed to make use of the epibole tes

and rely on its negative report:

"It is not possible to see how a

finite body can have infinitely numerous parts11 ?
.

No.

Epicurus continues at once with an appeal to sense-perception.

is a minimum visible quantity:

one cannot -- experience shows that one cannot --

divide a visible area into infinitely numerous parts.
sub-visible area,

We must believe that the

which is accessible only to the theorising mind,

same pattern as the visible one.

There

follows the

-12-

It is i nt eres t i ng that there are two analogies in this argument,
which is supposed to hold wh i le the other is n ot.

between the visible and the intelligible:

one of

Epicurus uses the analog y

he regards this as valid.

But we

might suppose that there is likewise an analogy between the minimum and
m ul tip l es of the min im u m in the visible field, and conclude that because we
can d is t inguish parts of s o meth ing that is lar ge r than the minimum we must
be able to distinguish pa rts of the minimum itsel f , since it is th e same kind
of stuff.

This analogy obviously has to be rejected.

Epicurus goes on at

once to reject another one:if we say the atom has parts,

we might be tempted to

think that it could be resolved into its parts like c omp o u n d bodies in the
sensible range:

but this again is obviously fa lse .

The reason why the analogy

can be seen to be invalid on both these cases is j u s t that the conclusion yielded
by the analogy has

alrea dy

been falsified by another argument.

that there is a min i mum visible quantity,

We know already

and that a tom s are indissoluble.

This pa s s a ge may perhaps throw some light on anoth er part of the Le t ter
to Herodotus:

an ob s cu re remark which Bailey used as th e main prop to support

his argument about epibole tes d ia noia s .
The sub j ect is this.

Epicurus has just asserted that atoms moving in the

v oid all move at the same speed,
bodies,

h oweve r ,

23

in whatever direction t hey are moving.

are seen to move at di ffere nt speeds.

How can this be?

answer is that t hou gh the compound appears to move all in a solid mass,
in reality composed of atoms and void,

Com po und
The
it is

and within its surfaces its component

atoms � moving to and fr o in all directions all at c on st a nt speed.

The s peed

of motion of a comp ound body depends on t he overall direction taken by it s
component atoms during a stretch of time .

Now,

moving from A to B, a distance of one metre,

suppose we have a compound

in 100 secon d s .

Then all its

component atoms have moved one metre in tha t d irect i o n in 100 seconds.

It is
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- 14 Bailey seizes upon this statement because it appears to say that epibole
tes dianoias is infallible.

He makes the statement into an entirely general

one by taking theoroumenon to mean "that which is grasped by the senses when
'looking'

at the close view";

thus he makes it a general statement of the two

sources of knowledge according to his view of Epicureanism:
and the direct mental apprehension.

But in fact theoroumenon must mean studied:

the word has occurred 16 words before,

precisely to distinguish what is studied

theoretically from what is observed by the senses.
sentence says,

it is all about thought.

the processes of thought are infallible.
since what is grasped by thought is true.
results,
asks;

24

However,

Whatever this concluding

it st i ll appears to say that

The contribution of

"Why is

�

�

and he answers, "with some hesitation",

is false,

liable to produce false

while the other (epibole) can only give us what is true?"

moves by one epibole after another,
another,

the close view,

Bailey

that it is because the mind

from one clear and distinct concept to

each of these concepts being clear in the same technical sense as that

in which the unimpeded view of a near object is clear.

I think the clue to understanding this cryptic sentence of Epicurus lies
in the passage quoted above.

25

What we have in both passages is a contrast

between the operation of �' and the epibole of the senses or the m i nd .
important thing is to realise the exact nature of the contrast.

it to mean that � goes wrong, whereas epibole is always right.

The

Bailey takes
But we have

seen in the earlier passage that epibole is responsible for dreams and
illusions, as well as for truth-telling apprehensions.
contrast is that when we experience a mental image,

The point of the

it always pictures

accurately the eidolon or set of eidola which cause it.

Error never arises

because of a lack of correspondence between the mental picture and the

..

- 15 -

ato'.Itic

configuration which

right,

too,

we ought

caused it.

to add)

second movement of the

mi nd ,

The possibility 0£ error (<.rnd of being

arises only at the second stage,
distinct from the epibole,

when �'

a

pronounces upon the

relation between the mental picture and the external world.
Epicurus should not use the word ale t hes of the primary impressions of
the senses or the mind.

It would be better to say they are neither true nor

But it is quite clear that he does use alethes in this sense,

false.

he is quoted as saying that ''the illusions
visions are true11•
move

( the su fferer ) ,

(phantasmata)

The explanation is ad ded :

since

of madmen and dream-

"they are true because they

,. 26

and wh at d oes not exist
.
does not cause movement

So I suggest that

Epicurus is not saying,

•

as Bailey tho ug ht ,

that �·s inference from the seen to the unseen in this case is wrong,
whereas the inference of JWibole to t he unseen is always right :
that it must be

� ·s

he is saying

inference to the unseen t hat is wrong in these cases,

because the error never lies in the mental picture itself.

He is not saying

that direct mental apprehension infallibly tells the truth ab out the external
world,

but only that our mental images are not the level at which mistakes

occur.
So,

what are we left with?

An examination of all the evidence, of which the gr eater part has been
discussed here,

offers no ground for accept in g Bailey's view of Epicurus.

27

Epicurus did not claim to have son1e kind of direct insi gh t which led to clear

and distinct ideas about the structure of the world.
arguments for his basic propositions,
perceptiono
most part.

He tried to present

based on the evid ence of sense-

Admittedly, h i s arguffients were extremely simple minded, for the
But I do not see any fundamental inconsistency in his position.

- 16 -

In particular,

he is not liable to the charge laid agains t him by Cornford,

that he dogmatically ruled out multiple explanations in his atomic theory,
while accepting them in his meteorology.
contradictories

--

His method was to s et up a pair of

either there is void or there is not, either matter is

infinitely divis ible or it is not -- and then to present an argument for
rejecting one of them.
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